ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
orporate reputation is defined as a set of collectively held beliefs about a firm's ability to satisfy the interests of its various stakeholders. It is an additional construct that combines cognitive dimensions and is based on firm's characteristics, such as firm's products and services, its strategy and quality of management, and its market position. Lee and Roh (2012) argue that corporate reputation differentiates a firm from others and attracts customers, suppliers, employees, and investors. Most of prior literature presents evidence on how corporate reputation helps firms to accrue benefits from different groups of stakeholders Roberts and Dowling, 2002) . Cornell and Shapiro (1987) , for instance, show that quality of firm's reputation increases its ability to engage in cheaper implicit contracts. They note that various claims issued by firms take the form of tacit promises of continuing supply, timely delivery, product enhancement, and job security. These claims are relatively cheaper to implement than explicit contracts and firms with high reputation are better positioned to take benefit of these claims. In another related study, Boyd et al. (2010) show that employees desire to work for firms with good reputations. As a result, reputable firms are able to recruit and retain a competent work force with less contracting and monitoring costs. This strand of literature argues that reputation serves as a signal to outside stakeholders that firm's offers (such as its products and services, employment conditions, or investment opportunities) are of high quality. A reputable firm, therefore, enjoys favorable premiums in various economic transactions relative to other firms. Favorable premiums enjoyed by reputable firms, eventually, translate into superior financial performance of these firms. Antunovich and Laster (1998) document that portfolio of the most reputable firms generate a one-year abnormal return of 3.20% and a three-year abnormal return of 8.30%. They also show that portfolio of the least reputable firms earn a negative abnormal return of 8.60%. In another related study, Clayman (1987) finds that the reputable firms outperform S&P500 by 1.10% a year. Beatty and Ritter (1986) argue that greater interest from investors translates into lower capital costs, thereby positively affecting the performance of firms with high reputation.
An important group of stakeholders that has received relatively lesser attention in prior literature on corporate reputation is financial analysts. Financial analysts are agents that gather, interpret and disseminate information about firms to investors. This paper argues that financial analysts are attracted towards firms with high reputation for a number of reasons.
• First, analyst's decision to cover a certain firm is a function of the demand generated by investors for analyst's research. We argue that firms having good reputation among investors are more likely to generate greater demand for analyst's research. Investors, being interested in these firms, would like to demand more information about these firms. Analysts are likely to respond to this increased demand of information by increasing their coverage.
• Second, corporate reputation may increase emotional appeal of a firm in the eyes of analysts. Gabbioneta et al. (2007) document that corporate reputation displays a high correlation with the overall disposition of financial analysts towards a firm. They show that firms with better reputation are preferred by analysts. Greater emotional appeal associated with reputable firms, therefore, leads to increase in analyst coverage.
• Third, we believe that analysts have incentive to cover those firms that are more likely to generate trading from investors. Analyst's compensation is, partly, a function of the trading that he generates via his research. We argue that it is easier for analysts to generate trading for firms that already enjoy good reputation among investors. Therefore, it is likely that analysts will cover firms that have good reputation.
Consistent with above arguments, this paper shows that the extent of analyst coverage is an increasing function of corporate reputation in Europe (Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Norway, Poland, Russia, Spain, Sweden, and Turkey) during the period between 2008 and 2013. We show significantly positive relationship between the extent of analyst coverage and corporate reputation during our sample period. Our arguments are consistent with Gabbioneta et al. (2007) who show that corporate reputation displays a high correlation with the overall disposition of financial analysts towards a firm. Reputation enhances the emotional appeal of a firm in the eyes of analysts and induces them to cover these firms. Our results have implications for firms in a way that it highlights the channel via which firms can attract more analysts. Given that analyst coverage can enhance firm value (Farooq and Satt, 2014) , any channel that can help improve analyst coverage is important.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 summarizes the data. Section 3 presents assessment of our arguments and Section 4 document robustness of our analysis. The paper ends with Section 5 where we present conclusions.
DATA
This paper documents the impact of corporate reputation on the extent of analyst coverage in Europe during the period between 2008 and 2013. For the purpose of this paper, our sample comprise of firms listed in Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Norway, Poland, Russia, Spain, Sweden, and Turkey. All data is in Euros. Following sub-sections explain the data in more details.
Corporate Reputation
Reputation is defined as a consensus impression about how a firm will behave in any given situation (Bromley, 2002; Sandberg, 2002) . It is based on a set of collectively held beliefs about a firm's ability and willingness to satisfy the interests of various stakeholders (Fombrun, 1996) . This paper uses the data from Datastream to develop an index of corporate reputation (CR). Datastream provides the binary data for the following items related to various dimensions of corporate reputation: The first item (CR1) indicates whether the company has a policy to avoid bribery and corruption. The second item (CR2) indicates whether the company has a policy towards business ethics. The third item (CR3) shows whether the company has a policy to be a fair competitor. The fourth item (CR4) shows whether the company has a policy to increase the indirect economic impact on local communities. The fifth item (CR5) indicates whether the company has a policy to treat its suppliers and contractors as key business partners. The last item (CR6) indicates whether the company monitors its reputation with communities? The above items capture various aspects of a firm's structure, policies and practices that constitute good corporate reputation. Each item is constructed in a way such that presence of that item adds one point to the reputation score. Thus, the rating is on a scale of zero to six, with a higher score indicating better corporate reputation. A total corporate reputation score for each firm is calculated each year. 
Analyst Coverage
We define analyst coverage (ANALYST) by the maximum number of analysts issuing annual earnings forecasts in a given year. Greater the number of analysts covering a firm, the better is its information environment. Data for analyst coverage is obtained from I/B/E/S. 
Control Variables
We use log of total assets (SIZE), total debt to total asset ratio (LEVERAGE), dividend payout ratio (PoR), and growth in total assets (GROWTH) as control variables. The data for control variables is taken from the Worldscope. We argue that these variables define the information environment of a firm to varying degrees. For instance, larger firms are more complex and therefore have higher information asymmetries (Vermaelen, 1981; Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991) . Firms with high leverage and growth are more risky and therefore require more careful evaluation (Smith and Watts, 1992; McLaughlin et al., 1998) . Firms with higher payout ratios or earnings are more likely to have better information environments (Jegadeesh, et al., 2004; LaPorta et al., 2000) . Prior literature considers information environment as a significant determinant of analyst coverage. However, the sign of this The Clute Institute relationship -positive versus negative -is inconclusive. On one extreme is a literature that considers negative impact of information environment on analyst coverage. For example, Lang et al. (2004) find that analysts are less likely to follow firms with high information asymmetries. While on the other extreme is the literature that documents the opposite. Lang and Lundholm (1996) , for example, find that analyst coverage is positively correlated with disclosure quality. Table 3 documents descriptive statistics for control variable. An interesting observation in Panel A is relatively low payout ratios by European firms during our sample period. Given that our sample period is the post-crisis period, we expect firms to be relatively conservative in their payout ratios. Furthermore, Panel B shows no severe multicillinearity problems between control variables. As a result, we can include all of these variables in regression equations. 
METHODOLOGY
In order to document the impact of corporate reputation on analyst coverage, we estimate the following regressions with the extent of analyst coverage (ANALYST) as a dependent variable and corporate reputation index (CR) as independent variable. All variables are defined as above. We use panel regression with fixed effects to estimate the following regressions. Hausman test is used to decide between the presence of fixed effects or random effects. Table 4 documents the results of our analysis. Our results show that higher corporate reputation score leads to higher analyst coverage. We document significantly positive coefficient of CR for all equations. Consistent with above arguments, we argue that firms having good reputation among investors are more likely to generate greater demand for analyst's research. Investors, being interested in these firms, would like to demand more information about these firms. Analysts are likely to respond to this increased demand of information by increasing their coverage. 
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS

Effect of Corporate Reputation on Analyst Coverage in Different Sub-Samples Based on Size
As a first robustness check, we divide our sample into sub-groups of small, medium, and large firms. We re-estimate Equation (3) for all sub-groups. Our results are reported in Table 5 . Our results show that higher corporate reputation leads to greater analyst coverage in sub-groups of small and medium firms. We report significantly positive coefficient for CR for these sub-groups. Interestingly, our results also show that there is no impact of corporate reputation on analyst coverage for large firms. We report insignificant coefficient for CR for large firms. We argue that larger firms have more resources to manage their reputation. Therefore, it is possible that all large firms have put in place better policies to manage their reputation. As a result, there may not be enough variation in CR within large firms, thereby resulting in insignificant relationship between corporate reputation and analyst coverage. Coefficients with 1% significance are followed by ***, coefficient with 5% significance by **, and coefficients with 10% significance by *.
Effect of Corporate Reputation on Analyst Coverage in Different Sub-Samples Based on Regions
As a second robustness check, we divide our sample into three sub-groups. First sub-group comprises of firms headquartered in France, Germany, Italy, and Spain (West Europe), second sub-group consists of firms headquartered in Finland, Sweden, Norway, and Denmark (North Europe), and third sub-group consists of firms in Russia, Turkey, Greece, Poland, and Czech Republic (Emerging Europe). We re-estimate Equation (3) for all subgroups. Our results are reported in Table 6 . We show that corporate reputation is a significant determinant of analyst coverage in West Europe and in North Europe. We report significantly positive coefficient of CR for these subgroups. In case of Emerging Europe, we report no impact of corporate reputation on analyst coverage. We report insignificant coefficient of CR for Emerging Europe. This result is interesting because it indicates that analysts do Coefficients with 1% significance are followed by ***, coefficient with 5% significance by **, and coefficients with 10% significance by *.
Effect of Corporate Reputation on Analyst Coverage at Different Quantiles
Our analysis implies that no matter what point on the conditional distribution is analyzed, the estimate of the relationship between corporate reputation and analyst coverage is the same. To test the empirical validity of this restrictive assumption and to document the relationship at different points of conditional distribution of analyst coverage, a quantile regression is applied at five quantiles (namely 0.10, 0.30, 0.50, 0.70, and 0.90) . The results of our analysis are reported in Table 7 . As was shown above, our results indicate that positive impact of corporate reputation on analyst coverage at all quantiles. We report significantly positive coefficient of CR for all quantiles. 
Coefficients with 1% significance are followed by ***, coefficient with 5% significance by **, and coefficients with 10% significance by *.
Effect of Different Dimensions of Corporate Reputation on Analyst Coverage
There may be concerns that not all aspects of corporate reputation are important for analyst coverage. In order to address this concern, we re-estimate Equation (3) by replacing CR with the individual components of corporate reputation index. The results of our analysis are reported in Table 8 . Our results show that CR2 (whether the company has a policy towards business ethics), CR3 (whether the company has a policy to be a fair competitor) and CR4 (whether the company has a policy to increase the indirect economic impact on local communities) do not affect the extent of analyst coverage. We report insignificant coefficients for these variables. The remaining three components of corporate reputation index (CR1, CR5, and CR6) are significantly related with analyst coverage. NOTE: Coefficients with 1% significance are followed by ***, coefficient with 5% significance by **, and coefficients with 10% significance by *.
CONCLUSION
This paper uses the data from Europe to document the relationship between corporate reputation and analyst coverage during the period between 2008 and 2013. Our results show that firms with higher reputation are followed by more analysts. Our results are consistent with Gabbioneta et al. (2007) who document that corporate reputation displays a high correlation with the overall disposition of financial analysts towards a firm. We argue that preference of analysts for firms with high corporate reputation may also be driven by the fact that these firms enjoy good reputation among investors. As a result, it is possible that investors demand analyst serices for these firms more than other firms. We also show that our results are robust for different estimation procedures.
AUTHOR BIOGRAPHY
Omar Farooq is working as an Associate Professor of Finance at ADA University, Azerbaijan. His main area of research is corporate governance.
